

BCHT BERKELEY CENTER FOR HEALTH TECHNOLOGY

**Comparative Effectiveness Research:** Clinical Evidence and Economic Incentives University of Paris-Descartes May 27, 2010

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	Is CER the solution? Why?
	<ul> <li>There is widespread uncertainty over <u>what works best:</u></li> <li>Despite huge investment in research, most uses of most therapies have not been studied</li> <li>Most drug studies compare effectiveness against placebo, not against major competitors</li> <li>Many medical devices have no clinical trial support</li> <li>There are few studies of drugs v. other interventions</li> </ul>
Source of Blame? Growing consensus that new clinical technologies are majo source of cost growth (e.g. not profits, waste)	
	Source for Solution? Policymakers prefer to support more research than to directly change the economic incentives that foster rapid development, adoption, and high pricing for therapies











Why Economic How can we pron	note CER findings?
Without Incentives	With Incentives
<ul> <li>Some CER findings will be unequivocal and will be put into practice by physicians without incentives:</li> <li>Therapies that have very high risks or zero benefit</li> <li>Therapies that have very high effectiveness</li> <li>♦ Here the only need is for <u>educational initiatives</u></li> </ul>	<ul> <li>But most CER findings will:</li> <li>Be equivocal (e.g., risks v. benefits, effects in subpopulations)</li> <li>Interfere with established patient preferences (more is better)</li> <li>Interfere with physician practice (paid more to do more)</li> <li> Here, unless evidence is combined with incentives, the evidence will only influence practice very slowly, or never</li> </ul>



















